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Grades of Discrimination:
Indiscernibility, Symmetry, and Relativity
Tim Button
Abstract There are several relations which may fall short of genuine identity,
but which behave like identity in important respects. Such grades of discrimi-
nation have recently been the subject of much philosophical and technical dis-
cussion. This paper aims to complete their technical investigation. Grades of
indiscernibility are defined in terms of satisfaction of certain first-order formu-
las. Grades of symmetry are defined in terms of symmetries on a structure. Both
of these families of grades of discrimination have been studied in some detail.
However, this paper also introduces grades of relativity, defined in terms of rela-
tiveness correspondences. This paper explores the relationships between all the
grades of discrimination, exhaustively answering several natural questions that
have so far received only partial answers. It also establishes which grades can
be captured in terms of satisfaction of object-language formulas, and draws con-
nections with definability theory.
1 Introduction
There are several relations which may fall short of genuine identity, but which behave
like identity in important respects. Such grades of discrimination have recently been
the subject of much philosophical and technical discussion.
Much of this discussion has been fuelled by considering the Principle of the
Identity of Indiscernibles: the claim that indiscernible objects are always identical.
The Principle is obviously of direct metaphysical interest (see [13]). But, within
the philosophy of mathematics, the Principle has risen to prominence via the ques-
tion of whether platonistically-minded structuralists can countenance structures with
indiscernible but distinct positions (see [26, §1]). And, within the philosophy of
physics, the central question has been whether quantum mechanics presented real-
world counterexamples to the Principle (see [22]). As discussion has progressed,
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though, it has become increasingly clear that we must distinguish between differ-
ent versions of ‘the’ Principle, corresponding to different notions of indiscernibility.
This has spurred several philosophers to investigate the logical properties of these
different notions (see [8], [17], [18]).
This paper completes that logical investigation. It exhaustively details, not just
the properties of grades of indiscernibility, but the properties of all of the grades of
discrimination. Indeed, this paper answers all of the mathematical questions that are
natural at this level of abstraction.
There are three broad families of grades of discrimination. Grades of indiscerni-
bility are defined in terms of satisfaction of certain first-order formulas, either with or
without access to a primitive symbol that stands for genuine identity. They have been
the focus of much recent philosophical attention. Grades of symmetry are defined in
terms of isomorphisms. More specifically, they are defined in terms of symmetries
(also known as automorphisms) on a structure. These grades have received some
philosophical attention, though in a slightly less cohesive way than the grades of
indiscernibility. Finally, grades of relativity are defined in terms of relativeness cor-
respondences, analogously to the grades of symmetry. The notion of a relativeness
correspondence has been studied by model-theorists, but is entirely absent from the
philosophical literature on grades of discrimination. This paper rectifies this situa-
tion, introducing grades of relativity for the first time.
I mentioned, earlier, that the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles has been
the main motivating force for interest in grades of discrimination. But it is now
worth pausing to consider broader reasons for investigating the logical properties of
the grades of discrimination.
The simplest reason to care about grades of discrimination is that they allow us
to calibrate relationships of similarity and difference. More ambitiously, though,
we might hope that some grade of discrimination will provide us with a genuinely
illuminating answer to the question: When are objects identical? To take a simple
example: set theory tells us that sets are identical iff they share all their members.
Consequently, some grade of indiscernibility provides a suitable criterion of identity
in set-theoretic contexts. To take a more contentious example: we might somehow
become convinced that nature abhors a (non-trivial) symmetry. If so, then some
grade of symmetry will provide a suitable criterion of identity in empirical contexts.
The general hope, then, is that our grades of discrimination may furnish us with some
non-trivial criterion of identity (in some context or other).
This search for a non-trivial criterion of identity need not be reductive. We might
simply seek an illuminating constraint upon the conditions under which objects can
be distinct. That said, some philosophers have hoped to find a reductive criterion for
identity; that is, they have hoped to replace the identity primitive with some defined
grade of discrimination. This reductive ambition is most prominent among those
who have defended some Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles; such philosophers
have therefore focussed on the various grades of indiscernibility. However, reductive
ambitions might, in principle, be served equally well by considering either grades of
symmetry or grades of relativity. (I revisit this in §8.)
Advancing a criterion of identity is not, however, simply a matter of selecting
some grade of discrimination. As we shall see, each grade of discrimination is de-
fined with respect to a (model-theoretic) signature. So, consider a signature which
contains just a few monadic predicates which stand for eye colour. If we present a
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non-trivial criterion of identity, in the form of a grade of discrimination defined with
respect to this signature, then we shall be forced to say, absurdly, that there is at most
one person with brown eyes. Consequently, any philosopher who wants to advance
a non-trivial criterion of identity must not only select some appropriate grade of dis-
crimination, but must also stipulate the particular signature she has in mind. (I shall
revisit this point several times below.)
In this paper, though, I am not aiming to advance any particular criterion of iden-
tity. My aim is only to provide a mathematical toolkit for anyone who is interested
in criteria of identity, whether reductive or non-reductive.
That toolkit is structured around three main results. Theorem 3.3 completely char-
acterises the entailments between the grades of discrimination. Theorem 4.8 estab-
lishes a Galois Connection between isomorphisms and relativeness correspondences,
which enables us better to understand the relationships between grades of symmetry
and grades of relativity. And Theorem 6.12, is a Beth–Svenonius Theorem for logics
without identity. By combining these three results, I answer several subsidiary ques-
tions concerning the grades of discrimination, including: which grades are equiva-
lence relations (§5); which grades can be captured using sets of first-order formulas
(§8); how they behave in finitary cases (§7); and how they behave in elementary
extensions of structures (§6 and §9).
I now state some notational conventions.
I always use ‘L ’ to denote an arbitrary signature, i.e. a collection of constants,
predicates and function-symbols. The philosophical discussion of grades of indis-
cernibility tends to be restricted to relational signatures, i.e. signatures which con-
tain only predicates.1 There are reasonable philosophical motivations for this: if we
assume that each constant names exactly one object, then we seem to presuppose
that we understand rather a lot about the notion of identity before we begin (see e.g.
[2], [8, pp. 40–1]); more generally, the very idea of a function seems to presuppose
the notion of identity; hence, if we want to avoid prejudging certain philosophical
questions about identity, it might be wise to restrict our attention to relational signa-
tures. The model-theoretic discussion of these issues is, though, less often restricted
to relational signatures. There is a sensible technical motivation for this: many of the
results hold in the more general case. Since this paper aims to provide philosophers
with technical results, I shall allow signatures to contain both constants and func-
tions, but I shall comment on the relational case when it is interestingly different.
For technical ease, I treat constants as 0-place function-symbols.
Where L is a signature, the L +-formulas are the first-order formulas formed in
the usual way using anyL -symbols and any symbols from standard first-order logic
with identity. In particular, then, they may contain the symbol ‘=’, which always
stands for (genuine) identity. The L −-formulas are those formed without using the
symbol ‘=’. L +n is the set ofL
+-formulas with free variables among ‘v1’, . . ., ‘vn’;
similarly forL −n .
I use swash fonts for structures and italic fonts for their associated domains. So,
where M is an L -structure, its domain is M. Where e = 〈e1, . . . ,en〉 and pi is a
function, pi(e) = 〈pi(e1), . . . ,pi(en)〉. Where Π is a two place relation, I write dΠe to
abbreviate 〈d1,e1〉, . . . ,〈dn,en〉 ∈Π.
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2 Twelve grades of discrimination
I start by defining six grades of indiscernibility; three grades ofL −-indiscernibility,
and three grades ofL +-indiscernibility.2
Definition 2.1 For anyL -structureM with a,b ∈M:
1. a≈m b inM iffM |= φ(a)↔ φ(b) for all φ ∈L −1
2. a≈p b inM iffM |= φ(a,b)↔ φ(b,a) for all φ ∈L −2
3. a ≈ b inM iffM |= φ(a,e)↔ φ(b,e) for all n < ω , all φ ∈L −n+1 and all
e ∈Mn
Similarly:
4. a =m b inM iffM |= φ(a)↔ φ(b) for all φ ∈L +1
5. a =p b inM iffM |= φ(a,b)↔ φ(b,a) for all φ ∈L +2
6. a = b inM iff a is identical to b
Here, ‘p’ indicates pairwise indiscernibility; ‘m’ indicates monadic indiscernibility;
and no subscript indicates complete indiscernibility.
There are several alternative characterisations of ≈, two of which will prove useful
(see Casanovas et al. [7, p. 508] and Ketland [17, Theorem 3.17]):
Lemma 2.2 For anyL -structureM, the following are equivalent:
1. a≈ b inM
2. M |= φ(a,e)↔ φ(b,e) for all n < ω , all atomic φ ∈L −n+1 and all e ∈Mn
3. M |= φ(a,a)↔ φ(a,b) for all φ ∈L −2
Quine was the first philosopher to analyse all six grades of indiscernibility. His fullest
discussion of them ended as follows:
May there even be many intermediate grades? The question is ill defined. By
imposing special conditions on the form or content of the open sentence used in
discriminating two objects, we could define any number of intermediate grades
of discriminability, subject even to no linear order. What I have called moderate
discriminability [i.e. =p or ≈p], however, is the only intermediate grade that I
see how to define at our present high level of generality. [25, p. 116]
Quine was right that Definition 2.1 essentially exhausts all of the grades of discrim-
ination that are fairly natural, highly general, and which can be defined in terms
of satisfaction of L −- and L +-formulas.3 Nevertheless, other grades of discrimi-
nation are quite natural; we just need to consider alternative methods of definition.
(The sense in which they are ‘intermediate’ grades will become clear in §3 and, as
Quine conjectured, we will see that they are not linearly ordered.)
In particular, I shall introduce grades of discrimination that are defined in terms
of isomorphisms. As a reminder:
Definition 2.3 LetM,N beL -structures. An isomorphism fromM to N is any
bijection pi : M −→ N such that:
1. e ∈ RM iff pi(e) ∈ RN , for all n-placeL -predicates R and all e ∈Mn
2. pi( fM(e)) = fN (pi(e)), for all n-placeL -function-symbols f and all e∈Mn
A symmetry onM is an isomorphism fromM toM.
Isomorphisms preserveL +-formulas (see e.g. Marker [20, pp. 13–14]):
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Lemma 2.4 LetM,N be L -structures, and pi :M−→N be an isomorphism.
For all n < ω , all φ ∈L +n and all e ∈Mn:
M |= φ(e) iff N |= φ(pi(e))
There is therefore a good sense in which objects linked by a symmetry cannot be
discriminated. Consequently, symmetries are a source of grades of discrimination,
and I shall be interested in three distinct grades of symmetry:
Definition 2.5 For anyL -structureM with a,b ∈M:
1. a sm b inM iff there is a symmetry pi onM with pi(a) = b
2. a sp b inM iff there is a symmetry pi onM with pi(a) = b and pi(b) = a
3. a s b in M iff there is a symmetry pi on M with pi(a) = b, pi(b) = a and
pi(x) = x for all x /∈ {a,b}
These three grades have already received some philosophical attention;4 one of my
aims is to incorporate them into the discussion in a systematic way.
In defining the notion of an isomorphism, the only object-language symbols
which are mentioned are those of the signature; there is no need to mention ‘=’.
Nevertheless, the notion of an isomorphism—and hence each grade of symmetry—
straightforwardly depends upon the notion of identity. After all, an isomorphism
is a bijection, which is to say it maps unique objects to unique objects, and vice
versa. This dependence on identity is reflected in Lemma 2.4: symmetries preserve
L +-formulas.
If we want to avoid treating identity as a primitive—for philosophical or technical
reasons—then the notion of an isomorphism is probably too strong. In looking for
a weaker notion, a first thought would be to consider functions between structures
that need not be bijections. (In this regard, strict homomorphisms are sometimes
considered.) But this is insufficiently concessive, since the very idea of a function
presupposes the notion of identity, for a function maps each object (or n-tuple) to a
unique object. Instead, then, we should consider structure-preserving relations that
may hold between structures. The appropriate notion is provided by Casanovas et al.
[7, Definition 2.5]; recall from §1 that dΠe abbreviates 〈d1,e1〉, . . . ,〈dn,en〉 ∈Π:5
Definition 2.6 Let M,N be L -structures. A relativeness correspondence from
M to N is any relation Π⊆M×N with dom(Π) = M and rng(Π) = N such that:
1. d ∈ RM iff e ∈ RN , for all n-placeL -predicates R and all dΠe
2. fM(d)Π fN (e), for all n-placeL -function-symbols f and all dΠe
A relativity onM is a relativeness correspondence fromM toM.
Casanovas et al. [7, Proposition 2.6] show that relativeness correspondences preserve
L −-formulas:
Lemma 2.7 LetM,N beL -structures, and Π be a relativeness correspondence
fromM to N . For all n < ω , all φ ∈L −n , and all dΠe:
M |= φ(d) iff N |= φ(e)
There is therefore a good sense in which objects linked by a relativity cannot be
discriminated. So, by simple analogy with the three grades of symmetry, I shall
consider three grades of relativity:
Definition 2.8 For anyL -structureM with a,b ∈M:
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1. a rm b inM iff there is a relativity Π onM with aΠb
2. a rp b inM iff there is a relativity Π onM with aΠb and bΠa
3. a r b in M iff there is a relativity Π on M with aΠb, bΠa and xΠx for all
x 6≈ a and x 6≈ b
Unlike the grades of symmetry, the grades of relativity have not yet been considered
by philosophers interested in grades of discrimination. However, there is no princi-
pled reason for this omission. Indeed, a central claim of this paper is that relativeness
correspondences (and hence grades of relativity) are the appropriate L −-surrogate
for isomorphisms (and hence grades of symmetry). This claim should already be
plausible, given that we arrived at the notion of a relativeness correspondence by re-
laxing the notion of an isomorphism, and given the immediate comparison between
Lemmas 2.4 and 2.7. The claim will receive further support during this paper.
For the reader’s convenience, the following table summarises the twelve grades
of discrimination:
Grade Informal gloss Definition sketch
= genuine identity a = b
=p pairwiseL +-indiscernibility φ(a,b)↔ φ(b,a), all φ ∈L +2
=m monadicL +-indiscernibility φ(a)↔ φ(b), all φ ∈L +1
≈ completeL −-indiscernibility φ(a,e)↔ φ(b,e), all e and φ ∈L −n
≈p pairwiseL −-indiscernibility φ(a,b)↔ φ(b,a), all φ ∈L −2
≈m monadicL −-indiscernibility φ(a)↔ φ(b), all φ ∈L −1
s complete symmetry a permutation pi(a) = b, pi(b) = a
and pi(x) = x all x /∈ {a,b}
sp pairwise symmetry a permutation pi(a) = b, pi(b) = a
sm monadic symmetry a permutation pi(a) = b
r complete relativity a relativity aΠb, bΠa and xΠx all
x 6≈ a,x 6≈ b
rp pairwise relativity a relativity aΠb, bΠa
rm monadic relativity a relativity aΠb
3 Entailments between the grades
Having defined twelve grades of discrimination, my first task is to characterise the
relationships between them. More precisely: I shall build upon some existing results
(mentioned in endnotes) to provide a complete account of the entailments and non-
entailments between the various grades of discrimination.
For any two grades of discrimination R and S, say that R entails S iff for any
structureM and any a,b ∈ M, if aRb then aSb inM. Entailment is relativised to
particular classes of structures—e.g. to structures with relational signatures—in the
obvious way. In §7, I shall consider the special case of entailments where we restrict
our attention to finite structures. However, the target result for this section is the
general case:
Theorem 3.3 (Entailments between the grades) These Hasse Diagrams charac-
terise the entailments between our grades of discrimination:
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=
s ≈
sp r
=p sm rp
=m ≈p rm
≈m
=
≈
s
sp r
=p sm rp
=m ≈p rm
≈m
The left diagram considers the case of arbitrary signatures; the right diagram con-
siders entailment when restricted to structures with relational signatures.
To explain the notation: there is a path down the page from R to S iff R entails S. So
in the case of arbitrary signatures: = entails≈; ≈ does not entail =; s does not entail
≈; and ≈ does not entail s. In the case of relational signatures: ≈ entails s; hence ≈
entails sp; etc. I shall start by proving the entailments:6
Lemma 3.1 For structures with arbitrary signatures:
1. = entails both ≈ and s
2. ≈ entails r
3. =p entails ≈p, and =m entails ≈m
4. =p entails =m, and ≈p entails ≈m
5. sp entails =p, and sm entails =m
6. rp entails ≈p, and rm entails ≈m
7. s entails r, sp entails rp, and sm entails rm
8. s entails sp, and sp entails sm
9. r entails rp, and rp entails rm
For structures with relational signatures, but not in general:
10. ≈ entails s
Proof (1). The identity map is a symmetry.
(2). The relation given by xΠx iff x≈ x is a relativity.
(3)–(4). Immediate from the definitions.
(5)–(6). Immediate from Lemmas 2.4 and 2.7.
(7). Every symmetry can be regarded as a relativity.
(8)–(9). Immediate from the definitions.
(10). If a ≈ b, then for any n < ω , any atomic formula φ ∈ L −n , and any
e ∈ (M \{a,b})n, we haveM |= φ(a,e)↔ φ(b,e).
It remains to demonstrate the non-entailments:7
Lemma 3.2 For structures with relational signatures:
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1. ≈ does not entail =
2. s does not entail ≈
3. r does not entail =m
4. sm does not entail ≈p
5. sp does not entail r
6. =p does not entail rm
Moreover, for structures with arbitrary signatures:
7. ≈ does not entail =m
Proof (1). In this unlabelled graph, A, we have 1≈ 2 but 1 6= 2:
1 2
(2). In this unlabelled graph, B, we have 1 s 2 but 1 6≈ 2:
1 2
(3). In this unlabelled graph, C, we have 1 r 2 but 1 6=m 2:
1 2 3
(4). In this unlabelled directed graph, D, we have 1 sm 2 but 1 6≈p 2:
1 2
4 3
(5). In D, again, we have 1 sp 3 but 1 6 r 3.
(6). Let E be the disjoint union of a complete countably-infinite graph with a
complete uncountable graph, i.e.:
E := R
RE := {〈n,m〉 ∈ N2 | n 6= m}∪{〈p,q〉 ∈ (R\N)2 | p 6= q}
By taking a Skolem Hull of E containing 1∈N and any e∈R\N, we see that 1=p e.
Now suppose that Π is a relativity with 1Πe. Since Π must preserve the edges of the
graph, and every element in either ‘cluster’ has an edge to every element in the cluster
except itself, Π must be a bijection between N and R\N. Contradiction; so 1 6 rm e.
(7). Augment A by adding a single constant which picks out 1.
It is simple to check that Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 yield Theorem 3.3. This Theorem
allows us to compare the consequences of imposing various grades of discrimination
as criteria of identity.
I should comment briefly on the philosophical significance of the constructions
used in Lemma 3.2. The existence of A is guaranteed by absolutely standard model
theory. However, A contains two distinct objects that are ‘blank’: from the per-
spective of A, these objects have no properties or relations to anything, so that their
distinctness must be brute. And this might suggest that the use of absolutely standard
model theory begs the question against anyone who believes in a non-trivial criterion
of identity. Fortunately it does not, but it is worth carefully explaining why.
Let Fran be a philosopher who advocates a non-trivial criterion of identity: in
particular, Fran thinks that x and y are identical iff x ≈ y. However, bearing in mind
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the discussion of §1—particularly of a signature which allows us only to describe
eye colour—Fran advances this criterion of identity with respect to some particular
signature, F . Now, if A is presented as an F -structure, then Fran will certainly
deny that A could exist. However, Fran can make sense of A by regarding it as
a G -structure, where G is a signature which is impoverished compared with F .
Construed thus, A begs no question against Fran, because it poses no threat to her
proposed criterion of identity.
To be clear: I am not trying to endorse or defend Fran’s position.8 My point is
simply that everyone, including Fran, can make sense of standard model theory.
4 A Galois Connection
Theorem 3.3 graphically demonstrates that grades of symmetry are to grades ofL +-
indiscernibility as grades of relativity are to grades of L −-indiscernibility. In this
section, I develop this point by outlining a Galois Connection between isomorphisms
and relativeness correspondences. (The results of this section can be fruitfully com-
pared with those of Bonnay and Engström [4]; we discovered our results indepen-
dently.)
Lemma 2.4 has an obvious converse: every bijective map which preserves all
L +-formulas is an isomorphism. However, there is no converse to Lemma 2.7. To
make this more precise, consider the following definition:
Definition 4.1 LetM,N beL -structures. A near-correspondence fromM to N
is any relation Π ⊆ M×N with dom(Π) = M and rng(Π) = N such that, for all
n < ω , all φ ∈L −n , and all dΠe:
M |= φ(d) iff N |= φ(e)
Lemma 2.7 states that every relativeness correspondence is a near-correspondence.
But the converse fails. Let F be an { f}-structure, defined as follows:
F = {1,2}
fF (1) = fF (2) = 2
Then Π = {〈1,2〉,〈2,1〉} is clearly a near-correspondence from F to F , but not a
relativeness correspondence.
However, there is an elegant connection between near-correspondences (and
hence relativeness correspondences) and isomorphisms on the models we obtain by
quotienting using ≈. The use of such quotients is standard in model theory without
identity, and the central idea is summed up in the following Definition and Lemma
(see Casanovas et al. [7, Definition 2.3–2.4]):9
Definition 4.2 LetM be any L -structure. ThenM is the L -structure obtained
by quotientingM by ≈. We denote its members with aM = {b ∈M | a ≈ b inM}
and, when no confusion can arise, we dispense with the subscript, talking of a rather
than aM. NowM is defined as follows:
M = {a | a ∈M}
RM = {e ∈Mn | e ∈ RM} all n-placeL -predicates R
fM(e) = fM(e) all n-placeL -function-symbols f and all e ∈Mn
10 T. Button
Lemma 4.3 LetM be anL -structure. For all n<ω , all φ ∈L −n and all e∈Mn:
M |= φ(e) iffM |= φ(e)
Casanovas et al. [7, Proposition 2.6] note that there is a relativeness correspondence
fromM toN iffM∼=N . I wish to build on this; and I begin with some definitions:
Definition 4.4 For anyL -structuresM,N :
1. C(M,N ) is the set of near-correspondences fromM to N
2. I(M,N ) is the set of isomorphisms fromM to N
3. c(M,N ) : I(M,N )−→ C(M,N ) is given by: apicb iff pi(a) = b
4. i(M,N ) :C(M,N )−→ I(M,N ) is given by: Πi(a) = b iff there are a′ ≈ a
and b′ ≈ b such that a′Πb′
Say that Π ∈ C(M,N ) is maximal iff no strict superset of Π is in C(M,N ).
I prove that these are genuine definitions, i.e. that c(M,N ) and i(M,N ) are func-
tions. I begin with c(M,N ):
Lemma 4.5 If pi ∈ I(M,N ), then pic is a relativeness correspondence, and hence
pic ∈ C(M,N ).
Proof Fix n < ω and suppose that dpice; i.e. that pi(d) = e. For each n-place L-
predicate R, observe:
d ∈ RM iff d ∈ RM iff pi(d) ∈ RN iff e ∈ RN iff e ∈ RN
For each n-place L-function-symbol f , observe:
pi( fM(d)) = pi( fM(d)) = fN (pi(d)) = fN (e) = fN (e)
so that fM(d)pic fN (e). Hence pic is a relativeness correspondence, and so a near-
correspondence by Lemma 2.7.
To show that i(M,N ) is a function, we need a subsidiary result:
Lemma 4.6 Let Π be a near-correspondence fromM toN , with aΠb and a′Πb′.
Then a≈ a′ inM iff b≈ b′ in N .
Proof Suppose a≈ a′ inM; then using Lemmas 2.7 and 2.2:
N |= φ(b,b) iffM |= φ(a,a) iffM |= φ(a,a′) iff N |= φ(b,b′)
So b≈ b′ in N , by Lemma 2.2. The converse is similar.
It follows that i(M,N ) is a function:
Lemma 4.7 If Π ∈ C(M,N ), then Πi ∈ I(M,N ).
Proof Lemma 4.6 immediately yields that Πi(a) is a well-defined function, and
indeed an injection. Πi is a surjection, since rng(Π) = N. It remains to show that
Πi preserves structure. For the remainder of the proof, fix n < ω and a,b ∈Mn such
that Πi(a) = b.
Let R be any n-placeL -predicate. For each 1≤ i≤ n we have a′i ≈ ai and b′i ≈ bi
such that a′iΠb′i; and hence:
a ∈ RM iff a′ ∈ RM iff b′ ∈ RN iff b ∈ RN iff Πi(a) ∈ RN
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Let f be any n-place L -function-symbol. For all φ(v1,v2) ∈L −2 , define φ f (v1,x)
as φ(v1, f (x)); and let b′ ∈ N be such that fM(a)Πb′. Invoking Lemma 2.2:
N |= φ(b′,b′) iffM |= φ( fM(a), fM(a))
iffM |= φ f ( fM(a),a)
iff N |= φ f (b′,b)
iff N |= φ(b′, fN (b))
Hence b′ ≈ fN (b) by Lemma 2.7. Now:
Πi( fM(a)) =Πi( fM(a)) = b′ = fN (b) = fN (b) = fN (Πi(a))
so that functions are preserved.
Lemmas 4.5 and 4.7 together show that Definition 4.4 is a proper definition. Its
significance resides in the following:
Theorem 4.8 (Galois Connection on ≈-quotients) For each Π ∈ C(M,N ) and
each pi ∈ I(M,N ): Πi = pi iff Π⊆ pic.
Proof Left-to-right. Suppose Πi = pi . Fix 〈d,e〉 ∈Π; then pi(d) = e, so dpice.
Right-to-left. SupposeΠ⊆ pic. WhereΠi(d) = e, there are d′ ≈ d and e′ ≈ e such
that d′Πe′ and hence d′pice′; so e = e′ = pi(d′) = pi(d). Hence Πi(d) = pi(d), for all
d ∈M.
This Theorem highlights the depth of the connection between isomorphisms and
relativeness correspondences. Additionally, it strengthens the claim that relative-
ness correspondences are the L −-analogue of isomorphisms. For, given that there
are near-correspondences that are not relativeness correspondences, one might have
worried that relativeness correspondences compete with the near-correspondences
to be the L −-analogue of isomorphism. However, the appearance of competition
vanishes, once we consider some consequences of the Galois Connection:
Lemma 4.9 For anyL -structuresM,N :
1. i(M,N )◦ c(M,N ) is the identity function
2. c(M,N )◦ i(M,N ) is idempotent
3. If pi ∈ I(M,N ), then pic is maximal
4. If Π ∈ C(M,N ), then (Πi)c is the unique maximal relativeness correspon-
dence that extends Π
Proof (1)–(2). Immediate from the fact that this is a Galois Connection with the
partial-ordering on I(M,N ) being identity.
(3). Let Σ ∈ I(M,N ) be such that pic ⊆ Σ, and suppose aΣb. By Lemma 4.7,
Σi ∈ C(M,N ), with Σi(a) = b. For any d such that apicd, we have aΣd, and hence
Σi(a) = d, so that b≈ d. Hence pi(a) = d = b, and so apicb.
(4). Lemma 4.5, our Galois Connection, and case (3) show that (Πi)c is a maximal
relativeness correspondence extendingΠ. To show uniqueness, let Σ be any maximal
relativeness correspondence extending Π. Consider any a,b ∈M such that a(Πi)cb.
Then there are a′ ≈ a, b′ ≈ b such that a′Πb′, and hence such that a′Σb′, sinceΠ⊆ Σ.
Hence, for any dΣe, and any φ ∈L −n+1, by Lemma 2.7:
M |= φ(a,d) iffM |= φ(a′,d) iff N |= φ(b′,e) iff N |= φ(b,e)
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Consequently, Θ= Σ∪{〈a,b〉} is a near-correspondence. So (Θi)c is a maximal rel-
ativeness correspondence extending Σ; but Σ is itself maximal, so aΣb. Generalising,
(Πi)c ⊆ Σ. Since (Πi)c is maximal, (Πi)c = Σ.
The preceding result tells us that every near-correspondence expands to a relative-
ness correspondence. Accordingly, there is no genuine competition between near-
correspondences and relativeness correspondences. Indeed, instead of defining the
grades of relativity in terms of relativeness correspondences, we could have defined
them in terms of near-correspondences. Or, even more simply, we could have de-
fined them in terms of symmetries on quotient models, as shown by the following
immediate consequence of the preceding results:
Lemma 4.10 For anyL -structureM:
1. a rm b inM iff a sm b inM
2. a rp b inM iff a sp b inM
3. a r b inM iff a s b inM
5 Equivalence relations
At various points, I have described the grades of discrimination as behaving like
identity. A natural question is whether the grades of discrimination behave like iden-
tity in being equivalence relations. (Note that I implicitly relied upon the fact that
≈ is an equivalence relation in defining the ≈-quotient structure.) Ladyman et al.
[18, Theorem 10.22] have partially answered this question, in noting that =p and
≈p are not transitive (in general). The following result, which employs our Galois
Connection, completes the picture.
Theorem 5.1 =p, ≈p, sp and rp are reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive (in
general); the remaining eight grades of discrimination are equivalence relations.
Proof Consider the following coloured graph, G:
1 2
3
45
6
Here, 1 sp 2 and 2 sp 3, but 1 6≈p 3. By Theorem 3.3, this establishes that =p, ≈p, sp
and rp are not transitive (in general).
The reflexivity and symmetry of all the grades of indiscernibility are immediate
from their definitions, as is the transitivity of =, ≈, =m and ≈m.
It is routine to check that all three grades of symmetry are symmetric and reflex-
ive, and that s and sm are transitive. Lemma 4.10 entails that the same is true for the
respective grades of relativity.
Since identity is surely transitive, Theorem 5.1 might seem to provide a knockdown
argument against treating any of =p,≈p,sp and rp as a criterion of identity. However,
this point is a little more subtle than it might initially seem.
Consider the discussion of A, at the end of §3. A might have seemed to present
a counterexample to treating ≈ as a criterion of identity. But any philosopher who
advocates such a criterion, such as Fran, will maintain that we can make sense of
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A by (and only by) treating it as a structure of some artificially restricted signature.
At that point, A no longer presents a counterexample to Fran’s proposed criterion of
identity, which she advances with respect to some richer signature.
With this in mind, consider Rach, a philosopher who advocates rp as a criterion of
identity. G might seem to pose problems for Rach. But if G is presented with regard
to Rach’s preferred signature, then it violates her proposed criterion of identity even
before we consider issues about transitivity: after all, G is to contain objects which
are distinct but (‘genuinely’) pairwise symmetric. Accordingly, Rach will maintain
that we can make sense of G by (and only by) treating it as a structure of some
artificially restricted signature. And at that point, G no longer demonstrates the non-
transitivity of Rach’s proposed criterion of identity, which she advances with respect
to some richer signature.
The situation, then, is slightly odd. From the perspective of anyone who thinks
that identity is more fine-grained than any of =p, ≈p, sp and rp, these four grades of
discrimination fail to behave like identity in an absolutely crucial sense, in failing to
be transitive. (This is why Ladyman et al. [18, p. 23] suggest that =p and ≈p violate
a plausible ‘minimal requirement’ on any notion of indiscernibility.) But it does not
immediately follow that one cannot propose one of these four grades as a criterion
of identity.
6 Connections to definability theory
I now want to explore some natural technical questions which have not featured on
the radar of philosophers interested in grades of discrimination. These questions con-
cern the relationship between grades of discrimination and elementary extensions,
and they relate to definability theory. My answers to these questions, together with
the Galois Connection of §4, will yield interesting entailments between the different
grades in special cases (to be discussed in §7). To be clear on terminology:
Definition 6.1 LetM andN beL -structures. Say thatM≺+N iff for all n<ω ,
all φ ∈L +n , and all e ∈Mn:
M |= φ(e) iff N |= φ(e)
Say thatM≺− N iff the above holds withL −n in place ofL +n .
There is a classic result connectingL +-indiscernibility with the existence of a sym-
metry in some elementary extension (see e.g. Marker [20, Proposition 4.1.5]):
Theorem 6.2 For anyL -structureM, the following are equivalent:
1. M |= φ(a)↔ φ(b), for all φ ∈L +n
2. There is an N +M and a symmetry pi on N such that pi(a) = b
For present purposes, the immediate import of Theorem 6.2 is that it yields a new
way to characterise =p and =m:
Lemma 6.3 For anyL -structureM:
1. a =m b inM iff there is an N +M in which a sm b
2. a =p b inM iff there is an N +M in which a sp b
This raises a natural question: Is there an L −-analogue of Theorem 6.2? There
certainly is; but to show this, I need two definitions. First, I need the ordinary notion
of a diagram:10
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Definition 6.4 Let L be any signature and X be any set. Then L (X) is the
signature formed by augmenting L with each member of X as a (new) constant.
WhereM is anL -structure, Diag+(M) is the set ofL +(M)-sentences satisfied by
theL (M)-structure formed by letting each e ∈M name itself.
Next, I need theL −-analogue for a partial elementary map:
Definition 6.5 Let M,N be L -structures. A proto-correspondence from M to
N is any relation Π⊆M×N such that, for all n < ω , all φ ∈L −n , and all dΠe:
M |= φ(d) iff N |= φ(e)
So a near-correspondence fromM to N is a proto-correspondence with domain M
and range N. The proof of the L −-analogue of Theorem 6.2 now amounts to little
more than a tweak to Marker’s proof of Theorem 6.2.11 I start with two type-realising
constructions:
Lemma 6.6 LetΠ be a proto-correspondence fromM toN . For any a∈M, there
is as an O + N with some b ∈ O such that Π∪{〈a,b〉} is a proto-correspondence
fromM to O.
Proof Define:
Γ= {φ(v,e) ∈L −1 (rng(Π)) | for some n < ω , some φ ∈L −n+1, and some dΠe,
we haveM |= φ(a,d)}
Consider any φ(v,e) ∈ Γ; since M |= ∃vφ(v,d) and Π is a proto-correspondence,
N |= ∃vφ(v,e). Equally, N can be treated as a model of Diag+(N ). So any finite
subset of Γ∪Diag+(N ) is satisfiable. Hence, by Compactness, there is a model of
Γ∪Diag+(N ), which we can regard as O + N . Now simply let Σ=Π∪{〈a,b〉},
where O |= Γ(b).
Lemma 6.7 LetΠ be a proto-correspondence fromM toN withM≺+N . Then
there is some O + N and a proto-correspondence Σ ⊇ Π−1 from N to O with
dom(Σ) = N.
Proof We construct an elementary chain. Since Π is a proto-correspondence and
M≺+ N , we have that for all φ ∈L −n and all aΠb:
N |= φ(b) iffM |= φ(a) iff N |= φ(a)
Defining O0 =N and Σ0 =Π−1, observe that Σ0 is a proto-correspondence fromN
to O0. This is our initial stage in the chain.
Now let {eα |α < κ} exhaustively enumerate N, let Dα = dom(Σ0)∪{eβ | β <α}
for each α < κ , and proceed recursively:
— Stage α + 1: Given a proto-correspondence Σα from N to Oα with
dom(Σα) = Dα , use Lemma 6.6 to obtain an Oα+1 + Oα and a proto-
correspondence Σα+1 ⊇ Σα from N to Oα+1 with dom(Σα+1) = Dα+1.
— Stage α , with α a limit ordinal: let Oα =⋃β<αOβ and Σα =⋃α<β Σβ .
Now let O =⋃α<κNα and Σ=⋃α<κ Σα .
Lemma 6.8 LetM be anL -structure with a,b∈Mn such thatM|= φ(a)↔ φ(b)
for all φ ∈L −n . Then there is some N +M and a near-correspondence Π from
N to N such that aΠb.
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Proof Given M,a,b as described, we have a proto-correspondence Π0 from M
toM with aΠ0b. SettingM =M0 =N0, we can repeatedly apply Lemma 6.7 to
construct an elementary chain (solid arrows indicate a proto-correspondence):
M0 M1 M2 . . .
N0 N1 N2 . . .
Π0 Π1 Π2Σ0 Σ1
where both Σi ⊆Π−1i ⊆ Σi+1 andMi ≺+ Ni ≺+Mi+1 for each i < ω . Define:
N =
⋃
i<ω
Ni =
⋃
i<ω
Mi
Π=
⋃
i<ω
Πi
It is routine to check that Π and N have the required properties.
We can now obtain ourL −-analogue of Theorem 6.2:
Theorem 6.9 For anyL -structureM, the following are equivalent:
1. M |= φ(a)↔ φ(b), for all every φ ∈L −n
2. There is an N +M and a relativity Π on N such that aΠb
3. There is an N −M and a relativity Π on N such that aΠb
Proof (1) ⇒ (2). Use Lemma 6.8 to obtain a near-correspondence, then use
Lemma 4.9 to extend this to a relativity.
(2)⇒ (3). Trivial.
(3)⇒ (1). Π is a relativity, and hence a near-correspondence by Lemma 2.7; the
result now follows sinceM≺− N .
This Theorem lends yet more weight to the claim that relativeness correspondences
are the L −-analogue of symmetries. Moreover, it immediately yields a new way to
characterise ≈p and ≈m (compare Lemma 6.3):
Lemma 6.10 For anyL -structureM:
1. a≈m b inM iff there is an N +M in which a rm b
2. a≈p b inM iff there is an N +M in which a rp b
Moreover, both claims hold with − in place of +.
Before continuing with the main aims of this paper, it is worth briefly stopping to
smell the roses. Theorem 6.2 is sometimes used as a stepping stone to the following
foundational result of definability theory (notation clarified in endnote):12
Theorem 6.11 (Beth–Svenonius Theorem, L +-case) For any L -structure M
with R /∈L and U ⊆Mn, the following are equivalent:
1. (M,U) |= ∀v(φ(v)↔ Rv) for some φ ∈L +n .
2. For every (N ,V )+ (M,U) and every symmetry pi of N : V = pi(V ).
3. For any L -structure N and any sets V0,V1 ⊆ Nn: if (N ,V0), (N ,V1) and
(M,U) all satisfy the sameL +-sentences, then V0 =V1.
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Pleasingly, we can use Theorem 6.9 as a stepping-stone to an L −-analogue of this
result; indeed, the main steps are exactly as in theL +-case:13
Theorem 6.12 (Beth–Svenonius Theorem, L +-case) For any L -structure M
with R /∈L and U ⊆Mn, the following are equivalent:
1. (M,U) |= ∀v(φ(v)↔ Rv) for some φ ∈L −n .
2. For every (N ,V )+ (M,U) and every relativity Π of N : V =Π(V )
3. For every (N ,V )− (M,U) and every relativity Π of N : V =Π(V )
4. For any L -structure N and any sets V0,V1 ⊆ Nn: if (N ,V0), (N ,V1) and
(M,U) all satisfy the sameL −-sentences, then V0 =V1.
7 Entailments in the finitary case
The results of the previous section immediately yield a special case of Theorem
3.3, obtained by restricting our attention to finitary structures.14 This special case
has already attracted some attention, since it is philosophically interesting,15 and the
following result completes the picture.
Theorem 7.1 (Entailments between the grades, finite structures) These Hasse Di-
agrams characterise the entailments between our grades of discrimination, when we
restrict our attention to finite structures:
=
s ≈
=p,sp r
=m,sm ≈p, rp
≈m, rm
=
≈
s
=p,sp r
=m,sm ≈p, rp
≈m, rm
The left diagram is restricted to finite structures with arbitrary signatures; the right
diagram is restricted to finite structures with relational signatures.
Proof Most of this is supplied by Theorem 3.3. For the remainder observe that if
M is finite, then N +M iffM =N . It follows from Lemma 6.3 that =p entails
sp and that =m entails sm; and similarly with Lemma 6.10.
However, a little work will yield an even stronger result: the grades of relativity
and the grades ofL −-indiscernibility also entail each other when the structure’s ≈-
quotient is finite. To show this, we need a few results. The first tells us when ≈ is
definable in a structure:16
Lemma 7.2 LetM be anyL -structure. If eitherL is finite and relational or M is
finite, then there is anL −2 -formula which defines ≈ inM. However, the restrictions
are necessary.
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Proof Case when L is finite and relational. Let φ1, . . . ,φn enumerate all the
atomicL -formulas. By Lemma 2.2, the followingL −2 -formula defines ≈ inM:
n∧
i=1
∀v(φi(x,v)↔ φi(y,v))
Case when M is finite. Let e1, . . . ,em exhaustively enumerate M without repe-
tition. So for all i 6= j between 1 and m, we have ei ≈ e j; hence by Lemma 2.2
there is some φi, j ∈L −2 such thatM 2 φi, j(ei,ei)↔ φi, j(ei,e j), and so the following
L −2 -formula defines ≈ inM:∧
i6= j
(φi, j(x,x)↔ φi, j(x,y))
The necessity of the restrictions. Let L contain one-place predicates Pi for all
i < ω , and a single two-place predicate R. Define:
H :=N
PHi :={6i,6i+1}, for all 0 < i < ω
RH :={〈2,1〉,〈1,0〉}∪{〈2,6n−2〉,〈6n−2,6n〉,〈6n−2,6n+2〉 | 0 < n < ω} ∪
{〈3,6n−1〉,〈6n−1,6n+1〉,〈6n−1,6n+3〉 | 0 < n < ω}
We can representH more perspicuously as follows:
2 4 6
8
P1
10 12
14
P2
16 18
20
P3
...
1 0
7 5 3
9
13 11
15
19 17
21
...
I claim thatH |= φ(2)↔ φ(3) for all φ ∈L −1 . To prove this, fix φ ∈L −1 and letK
be the (necessarily finite) set of L -predicates appearing in φ . Where H∗ is theK -
reduct of H, we have 2 sp 3 in H∗, and hence 2 rp 3 in H∗ by Lemma 4.10. Lemma
2.7 now yields that H∗ |= φ(2)↔ φ(3), and hence H |= φ(2)↔ φ(3). Now apply
Lemma 4.3.
However, where ψ ∈L +1 abbreviates:
∃x(Rvx∧∀y∀z((Rxy∧Rxz)→ y = z)))
we have H |= ψ(2)∧¬ψ(3). So no L −2 -formula can define = in H; and hence no
L −2 -formula can define ≈ inH, by Lemma 4.3.
We already knew that a≈ b inM iff a= b inM. Lemma 7.2 allows us, under special
circumstances, to obtain analogous results for our other grades of indiscernibility:
Lemma 7.3 LetM be any L -structure. If eitherL is finite and relational or M
is finite, then:
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1. a≈p b inM iff a =p b inM
2. a≈m b inM iff a =m b inM
Proof By Lemma 7.2, given either assumption, some L −2 -formula defines ≈ in
M. The same formula defines = inM, and the result follows via Lemma 4.3.
Finally, the Galois Connection of §4 allows us to extend Theorem 7.1, as desired:
Lemma 7.4 For structures with finite ≈-quotients:
1. ≈p entails rp, and vice versa
2. ≈m entails rm, and vice versa.
Proof Combine Theorem 7.1 with Lemmas 7.3 and 4.10.
Note that Theorem 7.1 does not hold for grades of L +-discernibility/symmetry. To
see this, let E∗ be a superstructure of E obtained by making R reflexive. Whilst E∗
has only two members and its signature is finite and relational, no symmetry on E∗
sends 1 to any element in R\N.
8 Capturing grades of discrimination
All twelve grades of discrimination have fairly straightforward definitions. However,
the grades of indiscernibility are defined in terms of satisfaction of object-language
formulas, whereas the grades of symmetry and relativity are defined are defined met-
alinguistically. It is natural to ask whether this is essential. More precisely, I shall
ask which of the grades are capturable, in the following sense:
Definition 8.1 For anyL -structureM, say that Γ⊆L2 captures R inM iff:
for all a,b ∈M : aRb inM iffM |= φ(a,b) for every φ ∈ Γ
Say that R is capturable+ in M iff some Γ ⊆ L +2 captures R in M (similarly for
capturable−). Say that R is universally capturable+ iff some single Γ⊆L +2 captures
R in everyL -structure (similarly for universally capturable−).
I shall consider capturability for each of the three families of grades of discrimina-
tion, starting with the grades of indiscernibility:
Lemma 8.2 1. =, =p, =m are universally capturable+
2. ≈, ≈p, ≈m are universally capturable−
3. There is a structure in which none of =, =p and =m is capturable−
Proof (1) and (2). Obvious.
(3). Let I be the following graph:
1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
For all φ ∈L −2 , I |= φ(1,4)↔ φ(1,7) even though 1 =p 4 and 1 6=m 7.
Lemma 8.3 1. s is universally capturable+
2. For finite structures: sp and sm are universally capturable+
3. There is a structure in which sp and sm are not capturable+
4. There is a finite structure in which none of s, sp and sm is capturable−
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Proof (1). For each atomic φ ∈L +n+2, define:
x'φ y := ∀v
(
n∧
i=1
(vi 6= x∧ vi 6= y)→ [φ(x,y,v)↔ φ(y,x,v)]
)
By Lemma 2.4, s is universally captured+ by the set of all such 'φ .
(2). From Theorem 7.1 and Lemma 8.2.
(3). Let J comprise two disjoint copies of the complete countable graph, with a
disjoint copy of a complete uncountable graph, i.e.:
J :=R
RJ :={〈m,n〉 ∈ N2 | m 6= n and m+n is even}∪{〈p,q〉 ∈ (R\N)2 | p 6= q}
By taking a Skolem Hull containing 1,2 and some e ∈ R\N, it is clear that:
J |= φ(1,2)↔ φ(1,e)
for any φ ∈L +2 . However, 1 sp 2 in J , whereas 1 6 sm e in J .
(4) In I from Lemma 8.2, 1 s 2, whereas 7 6 sm 8. However, for all φ ∈ L −2 ,
I |= φ(1,2)↔ φ(7,8) and hence I |= φ(1,2)↔ φ(7,8).
Lemma 8.4 1. r is universally capturable−
2. For structures with finite ≈-quotients: rp and rm are universally capturable−
3. There is a structure in which neither of rp and rm is capturable+
Proof (1). Let Γ be the set of allL −2 -formulas of the form:
∀v
(
n∧
i=1
[φi(x,x)∧¬φi(x,vi)∧ψi(y,y)∧¬ψi(y,vi)]→ [θ(x,y,v)↔ θ(y,x,v)]
)
for any n < ω , any φ1, . . . ,φn,ψ1, . . . ,ψn ∈L −2 , and any θ ∈L −n+2. I claim that Γ
captures r in anyL -structureM.
First, suppose a r b inM. Fix some γ ∈ Γ, and some e ∈Mn. Suppose that:
M |=
n∧
i=1
[φi(a,a)∧¬φi(a,ei)∧ψi(b,b)∧¬ψi(b,ei)]
Then by Lemma 2.2, ei 6≈ a and ei 6≈ b for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since a r b, Lemma 2.7
tells us thatM |= θ(a,b,e)↔ θ(b,a,e). HenceM |= γ(a,b), for any γ ∈ Γ.
Next, suppose M |= γ(a,b), for all γ ∈ Γ. I claim that the following is a near-
correspondence fromM toM:
Π= {〈a,b〉,〈b,a〉}∪{〈x,x〉 | x 6≈ a and x 6≈ b}
To show this, fix n < ω , θ ∈L −n+2 and e ∈Mn such that ei 6≈ a and ei 6≈ b for each
1≤ i≤ n. Since each ei 6≈ a and ei 6≈ b, by Lemma 2.2 there are formulas φi,ψi ∈L −2
for each 1≤ i≤ n such that M |= φi(a,a)∧¬φi(a,ei) andM|=ψi(b,b)∧¬ψi(b,ei).
Conjoining these, we get:
M |=
n∧
i=1
[φi(a,a)∧¬φi(a,ei)∧ψi(b,b)∧¬ψi(b,ei)]
SinceM |= γ(a,b) for all γ ∈ Γ, we obtain that, for all θ ∈L −n+2:
M |= θ(a,b,e)↔ θ(b,a,e)
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Generalising, Π is a near-correspondence. By the Galois Connection of Theorem
4.8, (Πi)c is a relativity onM; and so a r b.
(2). From Lemmas 7.4 and 8.2.
(3). Exactly as in Lemma 8.3, case (3).
Lemmas 8.2–8.4 can be summarised as follows:
Theorem 8.5 (Capturing the grades) The following table exhaustively details the
capturability of each grade of discrimination:
Grade Capturable+ Capturable−
= X ×
=p X ×
=m X ×
≈ X X
≈p X X
≈m X X
s X ×
sp f ×
sm f ×
r X X
rp f f
rm f f
The table of Theorem 8.5 should be read with the following key:
X universally capturable
× there is anL -structure in which the grade is not capturable
f universally capturable when we restrict attention to finite structures; but there
are counterexamples elsewhere
f universally capturable when we restrict attention to structures with finite ≈-
quotients; but there are counterexamples elsewhere
This demonstrates, once again, that grades of L +-discernibility are to grades of
symmetry, as grades of L −-discernibility are to grades of relativity. More interest-
ingly, though, Theorem 8.5 bears directly upon the philosophical search for reductive
criteria of identity.
As mentioned in §1, much of the interest in grades of discrimination comes from
their potential to provide us with a criterion of identity, possibly a reductive one.
However, if a grade of discrimination cannot be captured by some set of formulas in
the object language, this should bar it from use in any reductive criterion of identity.
After all, if the grade must be invoked as a primitive at the level of the object lan-
guage, it is unclear why we should not simply allow ourselves to take identity itself
as a primitive in the object language. The situation will be no better, in this regard,
if the grade can only be captured+ and not captured−. Consequently, no grade of
L +-indiscernibility or symmetry can provide a reductive criterion of identity.
The remaining candidates for reductive criteria of identity are therefore the grades
of L −-indiscernibility and relativity. However, in the special cases when they are
capturable−—which we require if we seek a reductive criterion of identity—two of
the grades of L −-indiscernibility are simply co-extensive with two of the grades of
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L −-indiscernibility (see Theorem 7.1). Hence the only plausible distinct candidates
for a reductive criterion of identity are, in order of entailment: ≈, r, ≈p and ≈m.
This does not show, though, that the remaining grades of discrimination are philo-
sophically uninteresting. After all, we might simply be interested in providing an
illuminating but non-reductive answer to the general question: When are objects
identical? To repeat an example from §1: if we have become convinced that nature
abhors a (non-trivial) symmetry, then sm could serve as a non-reductive, non-trivial
criterion of identity, even though it is uncapturable+.
9 Symmetry in all elementary extensions
In §6, I connected the grades of indiscernibility with the existence of a symme-
try/relativity in some elementary extensions. To close this paper, I wish to consider
what happens when we consider the existence of a symmetry or relativity in all el-
ementary extensions. In particular, I shall demonstrate a neat connection between
≈ and symmetries in elementary extensions. To show this, I first require a general
method for constructing such elementary extensions:17
Lemma 9.1 LetM be an L -structure with a ∈ M, and let D be a set such that
M∩D= /0. Then there is anL -structureN −M with N =M∪D, such that a≈ d
in N for all d ∈ D.
Proof Define σ : N −→M by: σ(x) = x if x ∈M, and σ(d) = a if d ∈ D. Set:
RN = {e ∈ Nn | σ(e) ∈ RM} all n-placeL -predicates R
fN (e) = fM(σ(e)) all n-placeL -function-symbols f and all e ∈ Nn
I claim that, for eachL -term τ , all d ∈ Dm and all e ∈Mn:
τN (d,e) = τN (a,e) = τM(a,e)
(where ai = a for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m). This is proved by induction on complexity. The
case where τ is an L -function symbol is given. Now suppose the claim holds for
τ1, . . . ,τk and consider τ(x,y) = f (τ1(x,y), . . . ,τk(x,y)). Then:
τN (d,e) = fN (τN1 (d,e), . . . ,τ
N
k (d,e))
= fN (τN1 (a,e), . . . ,τ
N
k (a,e)) = τ
N (a,e)
= fN (τM1 (a,e), . . . ,τ
M
k (a,e))
= fM(τM1 (a,e), . . . ,τ
M
k (a,e)) = τ
M(a,e)
This proves the claim. Hence, for all atomic φ ∈L −m+n, all d ∈ Dm and all e ∈Mn:
N |= φ(d,e) iff N |= φ(a,e) iffM |= φ(a,e)
So for all d ∈ D we have a≈ d in N by Lemma 2.2; and moreover N −M.
Thus armed, I can connect ≈ with symmetry in elementary extensions:
Lemma 9.2 For any L -structureM: if a sm b in every N −M, then a ≈ b in
M.
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Proof Suppose a sm b in every N −M. Let D be such that M ∩D = /0 and
|D| > |bM|. Construct N as in Lemma 9.1, so that a ≈ d in N for all d ∈ D. Since
N −M, by assumption there is a symmetry pi on N such that pi(a) = b. So, for
every φ ∈L −2 , and all d ∈ D, by Lemma 2.4:
N |= φ(b,b) iff N |= φ(a,a) iff N |= φ(a,d) iff N |= φ(b,pi(d))
Hence pi(d) ∈ bN for every d ∈ D, by Lemma 2.2. Since pi is a bijection,
|D| = |{pi(d) | d ∈ D}| ≤ |bN |. If a 6≈ b in N , then |bN | = |bM|, contradicting
our choice of D; so a ≈ b in N . SinceM≺− N and ≈ is universally capturable−
by Lemma 8.2, a≈ b inM.
Theorem 3.3 (left-diagram) entails us that there is no converse to 9.2 in the general
case. However, we do obtain a converse in restricted circumstances:
Lemma 9.3 WhenL is relational, for anyL -structureM: a≈ b inM iff a sm b
in every N −M.
Proof Immediate from Theorem 3.3 and Lemmas 8.2 and 9.2.
Moreover, we can strengthen Lemma 9.2 in the case of s.
Lemma 9.4 LetM be an L -structure with a ∈M and e /∈M. Let N −M be
constructed as in Lemma 9.1, so that N = M ∪{e} and a ≈ e in N . If a s b in N ,
then a≈ b inM.
Proof Suppose a s b in N , i.e. pi(a) = b, pi(b) = a, and pi(x) = x for all x /∈ {a,b}
is a symmetry on N . In particular, pi(e) = e. Hence, invoking Lemma 2.4, for
all φ ∈ L −2 : M |= φ(a,a) iff N |= φ(a,a) iff N |= φ(e,a) iff N |= φ(e,b) iff
N |= φ(a,b) iffM |= φ(a,b). Hence a≈ b inM by Lemma 2.2.
However, this strengthening of Lemma 9.2 is limited to the case of s. To see this, let
K comprise two disjoint copies of the complete countable graph, i.e.:
K = N
RK =
{〈m,n〉 ∈ N2 | m 6= n and m+n is even}
Whilst 1 6≈ 2 in K, we can use Lemma 9.1 to add a single new element, e, such that
1 ≈ e, without disrupting the fact that 1 sp 2. Moreover, nothing like Lemma 9.2
holds for relativities: Lemma 8.4 tells us that a r b inM iff a r b in all N −M.
The results of §6 exhaustively detailed the connections between grades of dis-
cernibility and the existence of a symmetry/relativity in some elementary extension.
The results of this section now exhaustively detail the connections between grades
of discernibility and the existence of a symmetry/relativity in all elementary exten-
sions. We thus have complete answers to several natural questions concerning the
connection between grades of discrimination and elementary extensions.
10 Concluding remarks
Several recent technical-cum-philosophical papers have explored some of the grades
of discrimination. This paper has pressed forward that technical investigation in
many ways. To close, I shall emphasise two.
First, I have introduced grades of relativity to the philosophical literature—along
with the notion of a near-correspondence, a relativeness correspondence, and a partial
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relativeness correspondence—and shown that these are the naturalL −-analogues of
the grades of symmetry.
Second, I have offered complete answers to the natural questions that arise con-
cerning all twelve grades of discrimination. Indeed, the technical investigation of the
grades of discrimination now seems to be complete.
Notes
1. An exception is Ladyman et al. [18, §6].
2. This family of definitions has a long philosophical heritage, e.g.: Hilbert and Bernays
[14, §5]; Quine [24, pp. 230–2], [25]; Caulton and Butterfield [8, §2.1, §3.2]; Ketland
[16, pp. 306–7], [17, Definitions 2.3, 2.5]; Ladyman et al. [18, Definition 3.1, §6.4].
3. Though Caulton and Butterfield [8] and Ladyman et al. [18] also explore the case of
quantifier-free formulas.
4. sm is considered by Ketland [16], [17] under the name ‘structural indiscernibility’, and
by Ladyman et al. [18] under the name ‘symmetry’. sp is considered by Ladyman et al.
[18] under the name ‘full symmetry’. s is considered by Ketland [16], [17], who writes
‘piab’ to indicate that a s b.
5. They credit a special case of this to Blok and Pigozzi [3, p. 343]; see also [28, §5].
6. Quine [25] proves case (4); see also Ketland [16, p. 307], [17, §3.2], Ladyman et al. [18,
Theorem 5.2]. Caulton and Butterfield [8, Theorem 1] prove case (5) when restricted
to relational signatures; see also Ketland [17, Lemma 3.22] and Ladyman et al. [18,
Theorem 9.17, 9.20]. Ketland [17, Theorem 3.23] proves case (10).
7. Ketland [17, p. 8] and Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 5.2] useA to prove case (1); see also
Button [5, p. 218] and Ketland [16, p. 309]. Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 9.17] use B to
prove case (2), noting that it is the analogue of Black’s [2] two-sphere world. Button [5,
p. 218], Ketland [16, p. 310] and Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 7.12] use an example like
C. Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 5.2] use an example like D. Caulton and Butterfield [8,
pp. 60–2] and Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 9.20] use examples like E .
8. I was once on Fran’s side [5, p. 220]; but I have changed my mind [6, p. 211 n. 8].
9. Casanovas et al. trace the definition and lemma back to Monk [21, presumably Exercises
29.33–34]. This has recently been rediscovered by philosophers, e.g. Ketland [16, p. 307
n. 10], [17, Theorem 3.12].
10. Whilst this notion of diagram invokes ‘=’, Dellunde shows that there is a perfectly work-
able notion of diagram which does not employ ‘=’.
11. In more detail: my Lemma 6.6 tweaks Marker’s Lemma 4.16; my Lemma 6.7 tweaks
Marker’s Corollary 4.1.7 (cf. also Casanovas et al.’s [7] Lemma 2.7); and my Lemma
6.8 tweaks Marker’s Proposition 4.1.5. The main difference is that I use proto-
correspondences rather than partial elementary maps, and in the final step I require
a detour, via Lemma 4.9, to obtain a relativity.
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12. Beth [1] proved (1) ⇔ (3); Svenonius [27] proved (1) ⇔ (2). (M,U) is the L∪{R}-
structure formed from M by allowing R to pick out U . As one would expect,
pi(V ) = {pi(e) | e ∈V}, and equally Π(V ) = {e | there are d ∈V such that dΠe}.
13. The only difficult step in either Theorem is (2)⇒ (1). For theL +-case, see e.g. Poizat
[23, Proposition 9.2]. To prove theL −-case, we simply tweak Poizat’s proof by invok-
ing Theorem 6.9 rather than Theorem 6.2, and considering n-types in the sense of L −n ,
rather than L +n . Dellunde [10, p. 5] and Keisler and Miller [15, p. 3] have shown that
L −n -types behave as one would hope.
14. An alternative route to Theorem 7.1 merits comment. We can use finitary isomorphism
systems to prove the coincidence of grades of L +-indiscernibility with grades of sym-
metry in finite structures, without invoking the results from §6. (For an introduction to
finitary isomorphism systems, see Ebbinghaus et al. [11, chapter XI].) Casanovas et al.
[7, Definitions 4.1–4.2] define the L −-analogue of finitary isomorphism systems. It
turns out that we can use these, analogously, to prove the coincidence of grades ofL −-
indiscernibility with grades of relativity in finite structures.
15. Caulton and Butterfield [8, Theorem 2] prove a special case of the mutual entailment
between sp and =p, and sm and =m, on the assumption that L is finite and relational.
Ketland’s [17, p. 2] attention is entirely restricted to finite relational signatures. Linnebo
and Muller [19, Theorem 3] note that witness-discernibility (a further notion, which I
have not discussed) is equivalent to ≈p in finite structures, and outline several reasons
for focussing on finite structures.
16. For the case whereL is finite and relational, see Ketland [17, Definition 2.3].
17. Monk [21, Theorem 29.16] described this explicitly; Grzegorczyk [12, p. 41] earlier
mentioned it in passing, implying it was mathematical folklore. The method was redis-
covered by philosophers, e.g. Ketland [17, p. 7] and Ladyman et al. [18, Theorem 8.14].
However, all these authors restrict their attentions to relational signatures.
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